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In this thesis the author examines the security aspects
of Computer Supported Collaborative Work (CSCW) and
Groupware, its enabling software. CSCW has been described by
some as computer-based tools which can be used to facilitate
the exchange and sharing of information by work groups.
Others have described it as a computer-based shared
environment that supports two or more users. [Bock92]
CSCW is a rapidly developing field that has attracted
the attention of a growing number of academics and commercial
vendors. Computer scientists are devising algorithms to
support concurrent activity; human factors specialists are
tackling the formidable challenges of group interfaces;
telecommunications firms are already looking for ways to
exploit the growing demand for collaborative products; and
behavioral and social scientists are trying to develop an
understanding of how work groups and cooperative
technologies will impact on the workplace. [Grud91]
Concurrently, computer security is also an active field
of ongoing academic and commercial development. Government
computer systems are required to address security concerns by
legal mandate, but non-governmental organizations also
recognize the value of protecting the secrecy, integrity, and
availability of their systems [Ricc93]. In response to the
demands of the marketplace, Apple, IBM, and Microsoft are
integrating significant security features directly into their
next generations of operating systems software [Schn92]
[Ricc93]. Some researchers are considering extensive
operating systems reengineering in order to support trusted
application programs [Grau92]. Others are concerning
themselves with social issues, such as the legal implications
of E-Mail privacy [Axsm92].
Some authors have raised the issue of security with
respect to CSCW [Mars92] [Pres92] and distributed systems in
general [Ryme92], but in the author's opinion, to date the
discussion has been poorly focused and somewhat cursory.
Part of the problem is that different authors often mean very
different things when they discuss computer security.
Secrecy, data integrity , and system availability/reliability
together comprise computer security [Pfle89], but the
security discussion with respect to CSCW has emphasized
technical issues which most directly impact collaboration on
networks and resource-sharing. The data integrity and system
availability/reliability aspects of the security problem have
received the lion's share of attention, while the secrecy
aspect of the problem has received little attention. Dennis
Eskow has written an excellent article which relates
information secrecy issues to civilian computing [Esko93];
however, his article is very much the exception.
The author sees a danger of standards and protocols
being developed which optimize collaboration, resource
sharing, and "open" CSCW, but which either fail to address
the secrecy aspect of the security equation in any meaningful
way, or worse, make the protection and control of user
organizations' information assets even more difficult than it
is today. Military organizations are required to address the
secrecy problem. Unless the Secrecy aspect is addressed by
the academic and commercial communities, military
organizations will be able to use CSCW products only under
conditions compatible with the lowest levels of security
control. The expected advances and advantages of CSCW will
bypass the most important military Information Systems unless
and until the secrecy aspect of the computer security problem
is addressed. The author realizes that many of the issues
and concerns involved may seem esoteric to civilian readers;
in fact, making the issues and concerns less esoteric is the
principle motivation behind this thesis.
In this thesis the author will address several
questions: Can sophisticated CSCW be accomplished on a
trusted system, and if so, how will security constraints
affect organizational structures and the accomplishment of
group work?
Chapter II presents a brief discussion of CSCW and
groupware with the goal of determining the applications and
features which will probably characterize the sophisticated
CSCW of the future.
Chapter III addresses the current federal computer
security requirements as delineated by the National Computer
Security Center's (NCSC) Trusted Computer Security Evaluation
Criteria (TCSEC), the "Orange Book." Meeting the TCSEC
requirements is a legal mandate for all government systems
and software procurement actions, and any government
organization which recognizes the value of CSCW and wishes to
apply cooperative computer technology to the accomplishment
of their mission will have to deal with the Orange Book
restrictions. Chapter III will also discuss some of the
recognized problems with the TCSEC requirements, and will
introduce the draft Federal Criteria which may replace the
Orange Book.
Chapter IV describes a high level conceptual scheme by
which functionally trusted CSCW might be accomplished, CSCW
which meets many, but not all, of the Orange Book
requirements. The scheme requires extensions to the
underlying principles of the current Orange Book requirements
in order to work, and the chapter will broadly describe the
extensions required. Next, a hypothetical user interface
will be described in order to illustrate how work would be
accomplished in a functionally trusted CSCW environment.
Chapter V describes some of the first-level (efficiency)
and second-level (social) effects that might be experienced
by organizations attempting functionally trusted CSCW.
Special attention is paid to internal organizational
structure, information compartmentation, and inter-
organizational effects.
Chapter VI provides a summary of this thesis and makes
recommendations for future research.
II. cscw
Mark Weiser and his colleagues at the Xerox Palo Alto
Research Center use the terms "ubiquitous computing" or
"embodied virtuality" to describe the computing environment
of the future. In this environment, computing technology
would be an integral, invisible part of peoples 's lives, as
pervasive and omnipresent as writing on paper is today.
Information would be freely transported and manipulated, and
the underlying technology would be widely distributed,
embedded in the everyday world. Current concepts like
Workstation, Local Area Net (LAN), and Wide Area Net (WAN)
would be obsolete, replaced by a generalized information
realm permeating virtually all human activity. No
spectacular breakthroughs in hardware or software development
are required to make this vision a reality. Evolutionary
improvement in display devices and wireless network
technologies will provide the prerequisite hardware, and
evolutionary improvement in scheduling, meeting, messaging,
and conferencing applications, as well as standards allowing
open information exchange, will provide the prerequisite
software. [Weis91]
Although Weiser never uses the terms CSCW or Groupware
in his article, it is clear to this author that the system of
applications and software functionality that makes Weiser 's
vision of ubiquitous computing possible are the descendants
of today's Groupware. This thesis is concerned with the
security aspects of CSCW, but the current state of groupware
is of less interest than the direction in which academic and
commercial inquiry is taking us. Let us begin to understand
that direction with an examination of the range of
functionality described by the term Groupware that will allow
sophisticated CSCW to emerge.
A. OVERVIEW OF CSCW CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS
Classification is usually the first step towards
understanding; however, one's choice of criteria can act as a
filter, highlighting some properties while obscuring others.
Fortunately, nothing prevents us from using more than one set
of criteria. Rodden and Blair examine existing cooperative
systems using four different modes of classification: system
tasks, form of cooperation, geographic distribution,
and style of control [Rodd92]. Their discussion is
comprehensive, and in the author's opinion, provides an
excellent framework for an understanding of CSCW. As will be
seen, Rodden and Blair's modes of classification address
almost all of the relevant issues germane to developing a
general understanding of CSCW and Groupware. Other authors
use taxonomies which address the same issues from slightly
different perspectives, and some of these systems will also
be discussed in this section.
1. System Tasks
Rodden and Blair first classify Groupware
applications according to the type of work they are designed
to accomplish. Based on this first criteria, they recognize
four general classes of cooperative systems:
a. Message Systems
As networks designed to support communication become
more widespread, electronic mail (E-mail) applications
increase in complexity and functionality. Each of the
currently available message systems make use of proprietary
message formats. [Rodd92] Under the taxonomy of Sproull and
Kiesler, such systems are called "Type 4 Groupware. "[Spro91
]
Examples of such systems include COSMOS, AMIGO, Object Lens,
Strudel, ISM [Rodd92] / Microsoft Mail, Lotus cc:Mail
[Higg92], and Wang Laboratories' Freestyle multimedia
communication system [Fran91].
Jb. Computer Conferencing
Also derived from E-mail systems, conferencing
systems group messages, usually by topic. More recently,
reliable high-speed conferencing systems which allow members
to communicate in real time have emerged (e.g. RTCAL,) and
the latest developments are desktop conferencing systems
which merge real-time conferencing with a shared windows
environment. [Rodd92] Under the taxonomy of Sproull and
Kiesler, such systems are called "Type 2 Groupware." [Spro91]
A further development is multimedia conferencing systems
which integrate text, audio, and full-motion video (e.g.
Rapport, MERMAID [Rodd92], and GTCS [Rudy9 2].)
c. Meeting Rooms
Automated face-to-face meeting rooms generally
consist of a conference room with a large screen projector, a
computer or network of computers, individual input/voting
terminals, and a control terminal. The system supporting the
meeting often uses multi-user software based on some form of
analytical decision techniques, graphics software, and vote
tally and display software. [Rodd92] Under the taxonomy of
Sproull and Kiesler, such systems are termed "Type 1
Groupware. "[Spro91] Examples include CoLab, Project Nick,
and the University of Arizona's Planning Laboratory. [Rodd92]
d. Co-Authoring and Argumentation Systems
Such systems support and represent the negotiation
and argumentation processes involved in group work. The
cooperative authoring of documents, where the final product
is the product of a software mediated process of negotiation
between the authors, is a current example of this class of
system. Examples of argumentation systems include gIBIS and
SIBYL; of co-authoring systems, Quilt and CoAuthor. [Rodd92]
2 . Forms of Cooperation
Rodden and Blair also classify CSCW by the way in
which group members interact, regardless of the tasks
involved
.
a. Purely Synchronous Systems
Purely synchronous systems require the simultaneous
presence of all group members. Typical examples include
real-time conferencing systems, and the brain-storming tools
sometimes used in meeting room systems. [Rodd92] Sproull and
Kiesler call purely synchronous systems "Type 1" or "Type 2"
Groupware . [ Spro9 1
]
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Jb. Purely Asynchronous Systems
Purely asynchronous systems facilitate cooperation
without requiring the simultaneous presence of all group
members. Such systems are often used to tackle structured,
prescriptive tasks accomplished through cooperation over an
extended time-scale. A typical example is cooperative
message systems, where users take on independent roles which
produce and consume messages. [Rodd92] Sproull and Kiesler
call purely asynchronous systems "Type 4 Groupware." [Spro91]
c. Mixed Systems
Mixed systems allow real-time synchronous cooperation
within the same framework as time-independent asynchronous
work, and contain elements of both synchronous and
asynchronous cooperation. Typical examples would be computer
conferencing and co-authoring/argumentation systems. [Rodd92]
Other examples of mixed systems are TWS [Ishi91], EuroPARC
Media Spaces [Caru91], QED Office-The Administrator [Dunc92],
and the current market leader, Lotus Notes [Cast92, Carr92,
Cast92, Rayl92, Sull92].
3. Geographic Distributions
Rodden and Blair's third system of classification
involves the distribution of the users of the system. (Under
this system the dichotomy between remote and co-located
systems is as much a logical concept as a physical
relationship. It is concerned with the accessibility between
users rather than their physical proximity.)
a. Co-located Systems
Purely co-located systems require the local presence
of all group members. Purpose built meeting rooms with a
large projected screen linked to a LAN of desktop computers
provide a typical example. [Rodd92]
b. Virtually Co-located Systems
Similar to purely co-located systems, virtually co-
located systems do not require all users to be in one room to
function. Real-time multimedia conferencing systems such as
MMConf and Cruiser provide typical examples. [Rodd92]
c. Locally Remote Systems
Locally remote systems provide high-bandwidth real-
time accessibility between users, often using shared screen
techniques. Co-authoring and argumentation systems (Quilt
and gIBIS) and real-time conferencing systems (RTCAL) provide
typical examples. [Rodd92]
d. Remote Systems
Remote systems assume the existence of only minimal
accessibility between users. message systems which assume
only simple communication systems and computer conferencing
systems which assume only rudimentary 'dial-in' connectivity
provide typical examples. [Rodd92]
The interrelationships of the first three classification






























Figure 1. Interrelationships of System Task, Form of
Cooperation, and Geographic Methods of CSCW Classification.
4. Styles of Control
In the author's opinion, Rodden and Blair's fourth
classification system, which is based on the style of control
a Groupware application supports, presents a valuable point
of departure for those most interested in the psychological
or management science aspects of CSCW, while at the same time
providing a means of relating existing or conceptual CSCW
systems to technically similar distributed systems.
Rodden and Blair recognize five different control styles
which range along an axis with unstructured tasks at one end
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and prescriptive tasks at the other. Unstructured tasks are
those requiring creative input from a number of users and
which are not often able to be detailed or described in
advance (for example, software design.) Structured tasks are
those involving existing solutions and procedural cooperative
mechanisms (for example, invoicing procedures used in large
organizations.) [Rodd92]
a. Speech Act or Conversation Based Systems
Such systems apply a linguistic approach based on
speech act theory. Cooperation is represented and controlled
using some form of network structure which details the
patterns of messages exchanged. Examples of such systems are
Coordinator and CHAOS. [Rodd92]
Jb. Office Procedure Systems
This class is characterized by the use of some form
of procedural language to describe and control group
cooperation by defining roles and activities. Tasks
performed are described in terms of the effect of
concombinant sub-tasks or procedures. Examples of such
systems include POLYMER, AMIGO, and COSMOS. [Rodd92]
c. Semi-formal, Active Message Systems
Semi-formal systems automate the most amenable tasks
while allowing other parts of the system to remain manual.
Examples are the Object Lens, Strudel Project, and ISM
systems. [Rodd92]
d. Conferencing Systems
Conferencing system control mechanisms are generally
minimal and fixed to applications. Traditional conferencing
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systems have human conference mediators while in more modern
real-time systems, most of the control is embedded in the
conferencing application software. [Rodd92]
e. Peer-group Meeting or Control Free Systems
This class of systems imposes little or no control
on users. Group members are allowed to formulate their own
protocols, and generally all users have equal status and may
amend and use the system freely. An example is the CoLab
system . [ Rodd9 2
]
Systems which exemplify the first three control styles
exhibit explicit control while the last two exhibit implicit
control. Rodden and Blair use this observation to relate
CSCW control styles to distributed systems technical issues
(see below.) [Rodd92]
5. Autonomous Agents
There is one emerging aspect of Groupware which
Rodden and Blair do not address: autonomous agents. Such
agents are "independent" software routines which support the
user, represent the user to the system, and handle complex
interactions with other cooperative agents and system
resources [Lee93]. Autonomous agents may be designed to be
highly visible and interactive, mimicking human assistants or
team members (Intelligent Agents); or they may be designed to




An intelligent agent is a virtual participant in a
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group process. For example, an electronic game system might
generate a non-human player automatically or at the human
players' request. Intelligent agents may be designed to fill
roles similar or different from the human participants.
[Elli91] They are similar to Bock's Active Information
Agents [ Bock9 2 ]
.
b. Coordination Systems
Often called the Links and Active Coordinators
[Bock92], Coordination Systems relate individual and group
actions to goals. [Elli91] They can be categorized by their
underlying control models (which in turn are similar to
Rodden and Blair's styles of control.) Typical coordination
systems include:
O Form or document routing models.
Procedure or process programming models.
© Conversation oriented models.
O Communication or role relationship models. [Elli91]
6. The Basic Questions of CSCW Classification
As was noted above, several similar Groupware
taxonomies are in the literature; however, the author has
observed that in general all of the systems are concerned
with the same basic questions:
O What is the group task?
What form of cooperation is required?
© What are the relative locations of the participants?
O What form of control is in operation?
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The answers to these questions classify any given CSCW
system, but another aspect of CSCW is relevant to our
understanding of Groupware— the social aspect.
B. THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF CSCW
A couple of years ago, a designer working on an
executive support system candidly observed that "If you
automate a mess, you are going to get an automated
mess." No longer are we simply applying technology to
expedite standard operating procedures. Rather, we are
concerned with altering operations and policies so that
business teams can "work smarter." [Bock92]
Sproull and Kiesler observe that while technological
systems are usually designed and implemented by organizations
in order to achieve predictable first-level efficiency
effects, almost inevitably the system chosen leads to
unexpected second-level social effects [Spro91]. A logical
task for social scientists is to predict these second-level
effects, and use their knowledge of these effects to
influence CSCW systems design. Among the authors who embrace
this role is Rob Kling, who goes so far as to state that "the
social dynamics of work make CSCW a social movement rather
than merely a technological advance." [Klin91] Group
dynamics is a useful perspective from which to approach the
most relevant social issues. A brief examination of the
basic principles involved will provide the basis for a
discussion of the social aspects of sophisticated CSCW at the
conclusion of this chapter.
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1. Group Dynamics
Cole and Nast-Cole provide an excellent primer of
group dynamics and how the issues raised relate to CSCW
design. They note that human group behavior occurs at three
simultaneous levels: the individual , the interpersonal
(dyadic), and the group. It is important for an observer of
any group to be conscious of the behavioral level under
study. One's choice of level will act as both a lens and a
filter; it will simultaneously focus and obscure the
phenomenon under study. They further observe that we have a
tendency to observe and attempt to explain group behavior at
the individual level, even when this is probably
inappropriate. Just as different perspectives are useful for
understanding (and classifying) CSCW systems, different
perspectives are useful for understanding group behavior.
[Cole92]
a. Purpose and Communication
New groups spend time establishing a group purpose,
a set of common goals. The group members then align their
personal (private) goals with the group's goals, after which,
the group pursues their common purpose through communication
at the group level. Simple communication is the exchange of
information between individuals; however, group communication
occurs only if the individuals assign a common meaning to the
information . [ Cole92
]
Jb. Content and Process
Content refers to the information being exchanged or
the analysis in progress. It is the actual work in which the
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group is engaged. Process is the means by which the group
accomplishes its work, that is, the methods and procedures
the group employs. Content and process must be observed
simultaneously, for only together do they provide the full
context of group actions. [Cole92]
c. Task and Maintenance Activities
Task activities are those activities which can most
directly be traced to the group purpose, while maintenance
activities are those which reinforce the structure and
function of the group. For example, a group meeting might
spend the minority of its time discussing recognized agenda
(task) items and the majority of its time on seemingly
irrelevant social discussions which in fact are reinforcing
group communication and aligning individual and group goals
( maintenance ) . [ Cole92
]
d. Roles
Roles are stances from which individual group
members operate for a limited period of time, and which are
not directly related to job titles. Different roles, such as
"mover, opposer, follower, and bystander" are generally
recognized by the group, and a variety of social clues (also
recognized by the group) signal a role change. For example,
a group member might use passive body language to signal the
adoption of the role of bystander in order not to interfere
in a heated group debate, then later use active body language
to signal the adoption of the role of mover or opposer in
order to help resolve the conflict. [Cole92]
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e. Norms
Norms are the commonly shared beliefs, attitudes,
and viewpoints that operate as a set of standards for the
group. Norms set the bounds of acceptable and unacceptable
group behavior. A specific set of group norms develop and
evolve over time, and are especially influenced by the
behavior of high-status group members. [Cole92]
f". Leadership
Good leadership is the great intangible of group
dynamics . Leaders must be concerned with group purpose and
communication. They must insure that content and processes
balance task and group maintenance activities, and through
the use of roles and norms leaders can exercise a profound
influence on group efficiency and effectiveness. [Cole92]
2. Stages of Group Development
Cole and Nast-Cole subscribe to Tuckman's five
serial stages of group development. These stages are
predictable steps in the maturation process of any group.
The rate and quality of the group's maturation is determined
by the quality of the group's experience at each successive
stage. These stages are:
O Forming — the social process of inclusion and
orientation.
Storming — the process of testing bounds, processes,
and capabilities.
© Norming — a fine-tuning of group relationships; the
building of team spirit.
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O Performing — the highly-productive stage of a mature
group.
Adjourning — wrapping-up after work is complete; the
process of closure. [Cole92]
Even an ad hoc group thrown together to handle a crisis
situation will pass through these stages— however briefly or
imperfectly. Even a group interrupted in its task will pass
through the remaining stages before it dissolves. Anyone
concerned with group dynamics (or the design of systems which
support group dynamics) will find it useful to be able to
recognize these stages and support their group dynamic
functions. [Cole92]
3. Group Dynamics and CSCW
Group dynamic theory suggests that any component of
a group system needs to be understood in the context of the
whole. Cole and Nast-Cole observe that this is also true for
the computer technology component of a system. The group
leader's commitment (or lack thereof) can determine whether
or not CSCW will gain acceptance. A system which does not
have provisions which allow group members to be aware of
other participants' transitory roles and normative states
will make an ineffective conference or co-authoring system.
Further, a system which does not recognize the maintenance
activity requirements of a group and supports only the task
activities will find the group members going off-line to
conduct required social interchange. Lack of immediate
feedback and traditional social cues in a poorly designed
19
user interface may cause social dysfunction in a group
attempting to accomplish politically challenging work.
[Cole92]
There are other social dynamic problems which plague
CSCW. Kyng notes that currently while manual work is often
accomplished through cooperative means, computer work is not.
This is largely a historical artifact which to a large extent
will be self-correcting as collaborative IS technology
matures. [Kyng91] The situation is ironic, because not only
has collaborative technology begun to mature, it has begun to
outstrip prevailing management attitudes. One barrier to
telecommuting is the perception that geographically remote
workers will be "invisible" and unable to be effectively
managed or controlled. Groupware has already improved to the
point that this perception is largely unfounded. [Peri91]
CSCW systems can exhibit a variety of control styles in
order to accomplish a variety of tasks in a variety of social
contexts. For this reason, no single prescriptive set of
CSCW requirements is possible; however, Rodden and Blair make
the following observations concerning group dynamics and
groupware design. [Rodd92]
O The organizational context of the work needs to be
captured.
© The many different forms of cooperation need to co-
exist.
© The structure and organization of groups need to be
explicitly recognized.
© Groups work in dynamic and unexpected ways.
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Groups are themselves dynamic.
O Control should be enabling rather than constraining.
In the author's opinion, all of these observations are
valid. Group dynamic principles must form the conceptual
framework for Groupware design. Technical considerations
must give way to social considerations. Groups cannot be
expected to accommodate their work habits to CSCW systems
which do not support the group's social needs.
C. CSCW ON DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS
Rodden and Blair observe that in most distributed
systems the problem of shared access is handled by masking
out the existence of other users. Until recently the
emphasis has been on non-cooperative tasks, because it was
thought to be important to "protect" users from the
underlying details of the computing environment. This
"distribution transparency," the conscious design of systems
which mask all of the problems inherent in distributed
systems, clearly contradicts the requirements of CSCW.
Distributed system complications (and solutions), such as
location (naming servers), access (remote procedure call
protocols), migration (load balancing strategies),
replication (multiple copy upgrade algorithms), and
concurrency and failure (distributed atomic transaction
mechanisms), have all been approached as problems requiring
prescriptive resolutions. Unfortunately, labile, complex
activities such as CSCW are constrained by prescriptive
solutions as often as they are empowered. In certain CSCW
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situations, a groupware application needs to "know" many of
the things that are being masked by the distributed control
system. In this light, a fresh approach to distributed
systems control is needed in order to support sophisticated
CSCW with any degree of efficiency. [Rodd92]
1. CSCW Tailored Distributed System Control
Rodden and Blair acknowledge that little work has
been done in the area of distributed systems control tailored
to the needs of CSCW; however, they identify three possible
lines of approach:
a. Clean separation of mechanisms and policies
If there is a clean separation between distribution
management control mechanisms and the policies which control
the use of those mechanisms, CSCW application programmers
would be free to turn on and off mechanisms which might
otherwise obstruct CSCW. [Rodd92]
b. Tailored mechanisms
A single set of mechanisms is unlikely to be suitable
for any given CSCW application, therefore, development of a
collection of mechanisms tailored to specific applications is
one possible approach. This approach might best be suited to
CSCW activities best suited for implicit styles of control,
such as speech act and conversation based systems, office
procedure systems, semi-formal systems, and active message
systems. [Rodd92]
c. Tailored policies
Distribution policies provide the avenue of approach
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to CSCW best suited to explicit control mechanisms, such as
conferencing systems, peer-group meeting systems, or control
free systems. They stress that "it is important to avoid
these policies overly inhibiting the cooperation of users."
[Rodd92]
In the author's opinion, Rodden and Blair's discussion
is particularly instructive. Standards and policies which
were designed to support one style of computing may be
inappropriate and constraining with respect to another style.
Their desire to accommodate distributed systems control to
the needs of CSCW is laudable, but what of the need for
security? If standards which support a stand-alone style of
computing are to be replaced by standards which support a
cooperative style of computing, shouldn't we insure that
these new standards support the secrecy, data integrity, and
system access needs of all users?
D. THE FUTURE OF GROUPWARE
Before addressing security concerns directly, the
features and functionality which will characterize the
groupware of the future must be stated explicitly. In the
authors opinion, the sophisticated CSCW of the future will be
made possible by Groupware and underlying computing
technology which will provide the following functionality.
1. Tasks, Cooperation, and Geography
Sophisticated Groupware will support all forms of
communication between group members. Message exchange,
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conferencing, co-authoring, and argumentation will be
supported, regardless of the geographic dispersion of group
members. Every form of cooperation between group members,
synchronous and asynchronous, will be supported, both
separately and simultaneously.
2. Styles of Control
Sophisticated Groupware will be characterized by a
variety of styles of control, each appropriate to the task at
hand. Groups will be engaged in a variety of specific tasks,
some structured, and some unstructured; therefore, no single
style of control will be appropriate for all uses.
3 . Group Dynamic Support
Sophisticated Groupware will only be possible in an
environment which supports individual and group communication
needs. Both task and group maintenance activities will be
supported, as will role-playing, norm formation, and the
transmission of any information needed for the group members
to be kept aware of group developmental stage transitions as
they pass.
4. The User Interface
The user interface of sophisticated Groupware will
be characterized by a curious paradox. Where needed, the
interfaces will be rich in group dynamic cues, enabling group
members to navigate from task to task while at the same time
being able to maintain awareness of the changing social
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fabric. At the same time, in the ubiquitous computing
environment of the future [Weis91], many group dynamic cues
will be provided by the fully integrated context of group
activities. In other words, when knowledge of the computing
context is required to accomplish work (e.g. asynchronous
message exchange) the interface will be specifically designed
to provide group dynamic information, but when knowledge of
the computing context is not required (e.g. full-motion video
conferencing) the transparency of the interface will allow
exchange of group dynamic information without any special
provisions.
5. Links, Coordinators, and Agents
A further characteristic of the sophisticated CSCW
of the future will be that many of the prescriptive, rule-
based tasks and activities which presently occupy our time
and limit the efficiency of groups will be handled by non-
human assistants. Whether called intelligent agents [Elli91]
or active information agents [Bock92] these assistants will
be a common feature of the ubiquitous computing environment.
E. CONCLUSION
It is evident that the sophisticated Groupware to come
will support open communication within working groups, will
be rich in social information and group dynamic cues, and
will have automated routines accomplishing prescriptive work
at the individual, interpersonal, and group level; however,
such a system presents significant challenges with respect to
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security. Free access to all information in the group domain
may facilitate CSCW, but some information must always be
protected. Even for organizations not overly concerned with
secrecy, data integrity and system availability will be
desired; however, Department of Defense (DoD) organizations
are concerned with secrecy, both for reasons of military
necessity and by legal mandate. The next chapter will
discuss the security requirements with which DoD
organizations (and all government agencies) must contend.
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III. COMPUTER SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
This chapter will examine the current federal computer
security requirements, as well as what in the author's
opinion is the principle sticking-point preventing the total
alignment of the DoD's information security (INFOSEC)
requirements with the DoD computer security requirements: the
"Human Trust Problem."
As was briefly discussed in Chapter I, the current
requirements have been promulgated by the National Computer
Security Center (NCSC) in the "Rainbow Series," the lead
publication of which is the "Orange Book." An examination of
the terms, requirements, and rationale embodied in the Orange
Book is more than an exercise of interest to federal
bureaucrats and military personnel. As major customers of
commercial systems, U.S. Government agencies are in a
position to profoundly influence the development and
evolution of technical standards. Thus even organizations
not governed by federal security requirements may find the
requirements impacting the available choice of products.
[Ricc93]
The Orange Book is 121 pages in length, and the entire
Rainbow Series is a total of 1,678 pages. It is not the
intention of this chapter to discuss all aspects of the
Rainbow Series in full detail, but rather to summarize the
embodied requirements as the basis for a later discussion of
trusted CSCW. The following is derived directly from the
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Orange Book [OrBk85]; however, other authors provide similar
summaries, with differing emphases [Chok92] [Ricc93].
A. THE MILITARY SECURITY MODEL
The hierarchical classification scheme used by the DoD
to describe the level of protection which is afforded
important information and processes is commonly referred to
as the military security model. The model is a lattice which
incorporates both mandatory and discretionary control.
Control is accomplished by a system of background
investigations which afford an individual potential access to
objects at a given classification level (mandatory control).
Once potential access to a given level is granted, an
individual will be given actual access to specific objects
based on the requirements of their current responsibilities,
on their "need-to-know" (discretionary control.)
In increasing order of sensitivity, the military model
hierarchical classification levels are: Unclassified
,
Confidential , Secret, and Top Secret. Information or
processes may also be placed in compartments; that is, they
may be placed in categories based on their subject or
utility. Compartments are often used as a convenient means
to administer discretionary control. A hypothetical object
might be classified secret, NATO. It is held (protected) at
the Secret level, and is in the NATO compartment.
Classification level and compartment, together, comprise an
object's full classification. [OrBk85] Numerous DoD policy
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statements mandate both mandatory and discretionary security
controls. [OrBk85, pp. 74-76]
Non-governmental organizations might rename the levels
of classification (public, sensitive, proprietary), and they
will certainly create their own compartments (sales, project-
blue, quality-work-group) , but many private firms have
adopted the most important elements of the military model for
their own purposes; however, the fact that the government's
mandatory control classifications have legal standing creates
an important distinction between non-governmental and
governmental (especially DoD) organizations. Private
organizations can decide to infer controls equivalent to
mandatory access controls, based on cost analysis or any
other paradigm. Governmental organizations have no such
freedom. Secret material is Secret material, and must be
treated as such until its status is changed by the
appropriate authority. [Ricc93]
B. ORANGE BOOK CRITERIA
The evaluation criteria defined in the Orange Book apply
to commercially available automatic data processing systems
(ADP), to the specification of security requirements for ADP
systems acquisition, and to the evaluation of existing
systems. In general, the criteria provides a basis for
evaluation of the effectiveness of technical security
controls built into ADP systems, the means by which a system
may be declared to be reasonably "secure." The criteria
specify that a trusted system will control, through the use
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of specific security features, access to information such
that only properly authorized individuals, or processes
operating on their behalf, will have access to or the ability
to read, write, create, or delete information. [OrBk85, p. 3]
1. Fundamental Computer Security Requirements
There are six fundamental Orange Book requirements,
the implementation of which infer a level of trust upon a
system. The first two requirements deal with the general
category of policy, the third and fourth with the general
category of accountability , and the fifth and sixth with the
general category of assurance.
a. Requirement 1 - SECURITY POLICY
"There must be an explicit and well-defined security
policy enforced by the system." A set of rules must be used
by the system to determine whether a given subject can be
permitted to gain access to a specific object. Both
mandatory and discretionary access controls are required.
[OrBk85, p. 3]
b. Requirement 2 - MARKING
"Access control labels must be associated with
objects." The system must mark every object with a label
that reliably identifies the object's classification level,
and/or the modes of access accorded those subjects who may
potentially access the object. [OrBk85, p. 3]
c. Requirement 3 — IDENTIFICATION
"Individual subjects must be identified." Information
access must be mediated on the basis of the identity and
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authority of the individuals attempting access.
Identification and authorization information must be
"securely maintained" by the system and must be associated
with every active element that performs security-relevant
actions in the system. [OrBk85, p. 4]
d. Requirement 4 - ACCOUNTABILITY
"Audit information must be selectively kept and
protected so that actions affecting security can be traced to
the responsible party." The system must have an audit log
which records the occurrence of security-relevant events;
however, the necessity of a capability to select audit events
in order to minimize the expense of auditing and to allow
efficient analysis is recognized. Audit data must be
protected from unauthorized modification or deletion in order
to permit post-violation investigations. [OrBk85, p. 4]
e. Jteguire/nent 5 - ASSURANCE
"The computer system must contain hardware/software
mechanisms that can be independently evaluated to provide
sufficient assurance that the system enforces requirements 1
through 4 above." There must be an identified and unified
collection of hardware/software controls which perform the
functions of security policy, marking, identification, and
accountability. These controls are "typically embedded in
the operating system" which is designed to be secure.
Sufficient documentation is required to make possible
independent evaluation of the compliance (and the basis for
the assertion of compliance) with the other requirements.
[OrBk85, p. 4]
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f . Requirement 6 - CONTINUOUS PROTECTION
"The trusted mechanisms that enforce these basic
requirements must be continuously protected against tampering
and/or unauthorized changes." This requirement applies
throughout the system's life cycle. [OrBk85, p. 4]
The requirements form the basis for the Orange Book
criteria classes, the classification scheme used to describe
a system's level of compliance.
2. Orange Book Criteria Classes
The classes are hierarchical and are divided into
four divisions, some of which are further subdivided. They
are: D, CI, C2, Bl, B2, B3, and Al, with class Al being the
highest. The criteria are transitive; that is, achievement
of a given level implies compliance with all requirements of
all lower levels. Four major criteria are addressed in order
to determine a system's class: security policy,
accountability, assurance (the fundamental requirements), and
documentation (the written user guides, manuals, and
test/design documents required for each division.) Relevant
to any understanding of the criteria is an understanding of
the concept of a Trusted Computing Base (TCB) . The TCB is
the totality of all protection mechanisms within a system,
hardware, firmware, and software. It is all of the features
which are responsible for the enforcement of a security
policy, and no security features relevant to the Orange Book
requirements can be considered to be external to a system's
TCB [OrBk85, p. 67]. For example, a bulk encryption mechanism
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used by a long-haul telecommunication network could be
considered part of a hypothetical system's TCB only if the
hypothetical system had actual control of the
telecommunication network. The following summaries give a
general idea of the requirements of each class.
a. Class D: Minimal Protection
Class D implies that a system has been submitted for
evaluation but has failed to achieve a higher classification.
In other words, a class D system provides no real security.
[OrBk85, p. 93]
b. Class CI: Discretionary Security Protection
The TCB of the system nominally satisfies
discretionary security requirements by separating users
and data. Some credible controls capable of enforcing access
limitations on an individual basis are incorporated. "The CI
environment is expected to be one of cooperating users
processing data at the same level of sensitivity." [OrBk85,
p. 93]
c. Class C2: Controlled Access Protection
The system enforces a more finely grained form of
discretionary access control, making users individually
accountable for their actions through login procedures,
auditing of security-relevant events, and system resource
isolation. [OrBk85, p. 93]
d. Class Bl : Labeled Security Protection
The system features an informal statement of the
security policy model, data labeling, and mandatory access
control over named subjects and objects. The capability for
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accurately labeling exported information must exist. Flaws
discovered during testing must be removed. [OrBk85, p. 93]
e. Class B2: Structured Protection
The TCB is based on a clearly defined and documented
formal security policy model that requires discretionary and
mandatory access control enforcement to be extended to all
subjects and objects in the ADP system. In addition:
O Covert channels are addressed (see section 4 below.)
© The TCB is carefully structured into protection-critical
and non-protection-critical elements.
© The TCB interface is well-defined.
O The TCB design and implementation enable more thorough
testing and review.
© Authentication mechanisms are strengthened.
© Support for system administrator and operator functions
provide trusted facility management.
© Stringent configuration management controls are imposed.
© The system is "relatively resistant" to penetration.
[OrBk85, p. 94]
f. Class B3: Security Domains
The TCB must satisfy reference monitor requirements
(see section 4 below.) It must mediate all accesses of
subjects to objects, be tamperproof, and be sufficiently
small to allow analysis and tests. The TCB is structured to
exclude code not essential to security policy enforcement
with significant engineering effort during design and
implementation directed towards minimizing complexity. A
Security Administrator is supported, audit mechanisms signal
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security-relevant events, and there are system recovery
procedures. The system is "highly resistant" to penetration.
[OrBk85, p. 94]
g. Class Al : Verified Design
Al systems are "functionally equivalent" to B3
systems; however, the development and implementation of the
system has been so carefully and formally modeled and
designed, and so thoroughly tested and documented, that it
can be stated that all security requirements have been met
"with a high degree of assurance." [OrBk85, p. 94]
All of these class requirements are discussed in much
greater detail in the Orange Book itself, and even further
detail and amplification is provided by the remaining volumes
of the Rainbow Series.
3. System Operating Modes
Another concept relevant to our discussion is that
of system operating mode. A system's operating mode
classification describes the clearances of the systems users
and the manner in which the system processes sensitive
information. (The following definitions are from the
instruction which implements the Department of the Navy
Automated Information System Security Program [NAISSP], and
as such impart formal significance to a system's
configuration description; however, the author will use these
terms in subsequent chapters in a less formal manner. That
is, if the author refers to a hypothetical system as
operating in one of the following modes, this will not imply
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full compliance with Department of the Navy requirements, but
simply to the clearances granted to the systems ' users
.
)
a. Dedicated Security Mode
All system users possess the proper mandatory and
discretionary clearance for accessing all data processed and
stored in the system. All information in the system is
handled at the highest level processed; that is, if the
highest level processed by a given system is Top Secret, and
the system is operating in dedicated security mode, then all
information in the system is treated as if it were Top
Secret. [NAISSP]
b. System High Security Mode
All system users have the mandatory clearance for
accessing all data; however, not all users have the same
discretionary clearance, the same "need-to-know." As in
Dedicated Security Mode, all information in the system is
handled at the highest level processed. [NAISSP]
c. Multilevel Security Mode
Some users using the system do not have the required
(mandatory) clearance for accessing the most sensitive
classified data processed and stored by the system. Trusted
data labels are maintained by the system. [NAISSP]
4. Other Orange Book Terms and Concepts
There are other security related terms and concepts
discussed by the Rainbow Series which will become relevant to
our discussion of the security aspects of CSCW. These
include:
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a. The Bell-LaPadula Model
The Bell-LaPadula model is a formal state transition
model that describes a set of access control rules. The
model divides all entities in a system into subjects (active
entities that cause information flow) and objects (passive
entities that contain or receive information), and enforces a
"secure state" by use of two properties:
O The Simple Security Property — An subject may only read
objects of the same or lower sensitivity level than itself.
© The ^-Property — A subject may not write to objects of a
lower sensitivity level than itself. [Pfle89]
The Bell-LaPadula forms the basis and formal conceptual
rationale for the Orange Book requirements [JaBk92, pp. 6-7].
b. Covert Channel
A covert channel is a communication channel that
allows a process to transfer information in a manner that
violates the system's formal security policy. Covert
channels may involve storage (the direct or indirect writing
of a storage location by one process and the direct or
indirect reading of the storage location by another process)
or timing (in which one process signals information to
another by modulating its use of system resources in such a
way as to affect the real response time observed by the
receiving process.) [OrBk85, p. 112]
c. Front-End Security Filter
A front-end security filter is a routine that is
invoked in order to process data as required by the system's
security policy prior to the data being released outside the
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TCB or immediately upon receiving data from an external
source. [OrBk85, p. 113]
d. Reference Monitor Concept
A reference monitor is an abstract machine that
mediates all accesses by subjects to objects. [OrBk85, p. 115]
e. Security Kernel
The security kernel of a system is all the hardware,
firmware, and software elements of a TCB that implement the
reference monitor concept. It must mediate all accesses,
must be protected from modification, and must be verifiable
as being correct. [OrBk85, p. 115]
f . Security Relevant Event
A security relevant event is any event that attempts
to change the security state of the system, and any event
that attempts to violate the security policy of the system.
(Hence, both authorized and unauthorized change attempts are
security relevant events.) [OrBk85, p. 115]
q. Sensitivity Label
A sensitivity label is an information unit that
represents the security classification of an object. The TCB
uses sensitivity labels as the basis for mandatory access
control decisions. [OrBk85, p. 115]
5. The Human Trust Problem
The DoD information security systems have always
relied on the element of trust, in the form of self-
censorship, to allow humans cleared to access high level
information to interact with humans only cleared for low
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level information. Hence Commanding Officers, possessing the
highest levels of clearance at their commands, may converse
and correspond with any and all members of their commands,
and they are trusted not to divulge unauthorized information
[INFOSEC]. This state of affairs may occasionally lead to
the leaking of information, but in the author's opinion,
security minded organizations have little choice but to rely
on the discretion of their members.
The human users of any computer are as much a part of
the system as the hardware, firmware, or software. The
Orange Book recognizes human users as system elements;
however, its reliance on the Bell-LaPadula model leads to
direct complications. Technology cannot be granted trust
based on a background investigation. Technology must be
empirically proven to be trustworthy. Mechanical systems
which comply with the restrictions of the Bell-LaPadula model
can be proven trustworthy [Pfle89], but since it cannot be
guaranteed that the human elements of an information system
would never violate the ^-property (i.e., that high-level
individuals would never interact with low-level individuals )
,
full system trust certification of a multi-level system is
somewhat problematical [OrBk85] [Ricc93]. This "human trust"
dilemma has lead to the call for revised computer security
standards, which are briefly discussed below.
6 . CSCW and the Orange Book
Ignoring for the moment the consequences of the
human trust problem, the concepts and requirements of the
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Orange Book lead to several constraints which in the author's
opinion would characterize any "trusted" computer system
capable of supporting sophisticated CSCW.
In the author's opinion, the Orange Book requirements
are conceptually oriented towards a view of computer systems
as stand-alone systems. Since the preservation of secrecy is
the paramount goal, isolation of the TCB (if not the system
in its entirety) is seen as the solution to the security
problem. This perceived predilection for isolating solutions
makes the Orange Book especially poorly suited to the
solution of cooperative/collaborative security problems.
The Orange Book adopted the Bell-LaPadula model because
it was the leading state transition model that could be
mathematically verified as preserving secrecy. Regardless of
the system operating mode, a trusted system (one which has
been verified as fulfilling all of the Orange Book
requirements ) has a TCB which controls all security relevant
events. The system's security kernel mediates all accesses
by subjects to objects. Even if the trusted system were
geographically distributed, all elements of the system would
be under the control of one TCB. Subjects "foreign" to the
system would only be allowed access after they had been
"naturalized" by passage through a front-end security filter
in accordance with the system's security policy. All
subjects and objects in the system (even naturalized foreign
subjects and objects) would have tamper-proof sensitivity
labels, and for the system to operate with reliability and
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efficiency, the system's reference monitor would have to be
conceptually coherent and relatively straightforward.
It is the author's belief that under such conditions the
casual migration of subjects between work groups under the
control of different TCB's is not possible. At the very
least, coordination of CSCW between different trusted systems
would require extensive communication between the Security
Administrators of each TCB. The degree of constant
coordination required would probably be considered onerous by
most groups, and at least in the immediate future,
distributed inter-system CSCW will probably only be attempted
on systems where the user's access authorities approximate
the Dedicated or System High Modes of operation.
Intra-system CSCW, still ignoring the Human Trust
problem, in which the group works within and under the
control of one TCB, is not a technically challenging
proposition in the Dedicated or System High Modes of
operation; however, intra-system CSCW in the Multilevel
Security Mode offers coordination and control challenges
similar to those discussed above. In the next chapter the
manner in which functionally trusted CSCW (FT-CSCW) on a
single system operating in Multilevel Security Mode might be
conducted will be explored.
C. DRAFT FEDERAL CRITERIA
Before leaving our discussion of the computer security
requirements, it is worth noting that the restrictive nature
of the Orange Book requirements is a recognized problem
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[Ricc93], and a more flexible set of requirements is under
development. In the most general terms, the current draft of
the new Federal Criteria recognize that not all federal
systems should exclusively emphasize system secrecy. Some
federal and many commercial systems should emphasize system
integrity. The new criteria mandate the formulation of
"protection profiles" as part of the systems development
process. The TCB is modularized into distinct functions and
processes, and a given protection profile would describe and
justify a particular collection of TCB module descriptions.
The current Orange Book criteria have the intent of defining
the means by which any system might be declared to be
"trusted" or "secure," regardless of the system's intended
use. The draft criteria propose a classification system
(CS1-CS4) designed to support profiles built around either a
well defined secrecy or integrity model. Under the draft
Federal Criteria, the means are described by which a system
might be declared to be "sufficiently trusted," or "secure
enough." Under the draft Federal Criteria, a military system
processing highly sensitive information would probably
operate under a protection profile quite similar to the
current Orange Book requirements; however, a non-military
system processing non-sensitive information would probably
develop a protection profile allowing the use of commercial-
off-the-shelf (COTS) software that would be totally
unacceptable for military use. [FedC92]
It should be emphasized that the new criteria are in
draft form and may evolve significantly before they are
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adopted; however, in the opinion of the author, it is highly
probable that for organizations predominately concerned with
secrecy (such as the DoD), the principles and concepts
discussed in this chapter will bind "trusted" CSCW for the
foreseeable future, whether they are operating under the
Orange Book criteria or a Federal Criteria protection
profile.
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IV. FUNCTIONALLY TRUSTED CSCW
In this chapter the author will develop a conceptual
scheme that describes in broad terms the means by which CSCW
might be accomplished on a functionally trusted information
system, an information system that meets all of the orange
book requirements with the exception of the human trust
problem. This scheme, "Functionally Trusted CSCW" (FT-CSCW),
would allow an organization to conduct CSCW with "reasonable
security" (although not with the formal certified trust
conveyed by full compliance with the Orange Book criteria.
)
The FT-CSCW scheme creates sensitivity labels which
provide group security domain information to the system's
security kernel. This allows the reference model to broker
all security relevant events with minimal overhead while
conceptually organizing objects and subjects into collections
that have a "group identity."
As discussed in Chapter III, the Orange Book cannot
grant trust to the human members of an IS. This human trust
problem is a severe restriction for any organization wishing
to attempt trusted collaborative computing. In strict
compliance with the Bell-LaPadula model, an individual with a
high sensitivity clearance is not even allowed to acknowledge
receipt of e-mail from an individual with a low sensitivity
clearance (as this would violate the ^-property.) Obviously,
some concessions to reality are necessary or CSCW which
accommodates the secrecy aspect of computer security will
never be possible. FT-CSCW attempts to fill this role.
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First, the extensions to Bell-LaPadula needed to make
FT-CSCW possible will be described, then a series of
definitions and conventions which would allow the creation of
group sensitivity labels will be given. Finally, a
hypothetical user interface will be used to illustrate how
the individuals of a hypothetical organization would
accomplish FT-CSCW. The chapter will conclude with a
description of "tactical" FT-CSCW, how work in a hypothetical
organization would be accomplished at the group level.
A. BELL-LAPADULA EXTENDED FOR GROUPS
FT-CSCW is facilitated by two extensions of the Bell-
LaPadula model: a provision for the formal declassification
of objects, and the development of a group sensitivity label.
1. The Formal Declassification of Objects
The Bell-LaPadula model has no provision for the
declassification of objects, and this would make it
impossible for work accomplished by a work group at a higher
level to be shared with lower levels. It is proposed that
closely guarded utility subjects that declassify objects be
allowed. Information security regulations designed for non-
automated systems allow (and specify the control requirements
for) the declassification of information. Similar allowances
should be made for automated systems. The subjects in
question should be high privilege utility routines that could
only be invoked directly, and only under highly controlled
conditions by human users.
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It is probably not possible to formally prove that
systems with declassification channels are totally secure,
hence this provision is a deviation from the current Orange
Book concept of trust. It is a concession to utility.
2. Group Sensitivity Labels
The creation of a mechanism by which the subjects
and objects in a system could be reliably associated with
work groups might make functionally trusted CSCW possible.
The following definitions and conventions describe and
clarify concepts and relationships which make group
sensitivity labels possible.
a. Definitions:
(1) Object. An object is a passive entity in the
system, for example, a data element.
(2) Subject. A subject is an active entity,
human or non-human. Examples would be a data
processing routine, and a human user.
(3) Member. A member is a human subject.
(4) Sensitivity Level. A sensitivity level (s L )
is an element of a partially ordered set
S = {Sj, s 2/ s 3 , ..., sn}, the sensitivity of the
elements of S being ordered under the '<' operator;
the sensitivity of s 1 < the sensitivity of s 2 < the
sensitivity of s 3 , etc. In an organization using
a simple military model:
S — {Unclassified, Confidential, Secret, Top Secret}.
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(5) Compartment. A compartment (c ± ) is a container
which can hold a grouping of objects of
varying sensitivity levels. A compartment is
also an element of the set of all compartments
in an organization, C = {c lf c 2 , c 3 , ~, cp>.
(6) Compartment List. A compartment list (Li)
is a set of compartments: L± = {c lr c 2 , c 3 , ..., cm}
.
A military example of a compartment list might be:
L± = {NATO, INTEL, CRYPTO, LOGISTICS)
(7) Work Group. A work group (gx ) is an arbitrary
unordered set of j members:
9x = {ml/ m2' m3' -f mj>*
(8) Work Group List. A work group list (Gi) is
the set of all work groups in an organization:
G = i9lr 92/ 93/ •••/ 9k>-
£>. Conventions
(1) Security Domain. The security domain (D) of
a system is described by all possible pairings of
all sensitivity levels and all compartments:
D = S x c (See subsection c below.)
(2) Individual Security Domain. An individual
security domain dA is a particular subset of D
(di C D) , a listing of all objects in D which
individual i is authorized to access.
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(3) Group Security Domain. A work group's security
domain (6A ) is that subset of D listing all objects
in D which all members of working group A are
authorized to access: 6A 6 1 D d2 n d 3 n ~. n dj,
where gA has j members. Group security domains
will be subject to the following conditions:
O The sensitivity level of gA will be no greater
than the lowest sensitivity level of any
member of gA .
G The compartment list of gA will be the least
common subset of the compartment lists of all
members of gA: LgA 1^m1 n ^m2 n ^3 n - O *hl
c. A Security Domain Example.
In a hypothetical system with four sensitivity levels
and five compartments, the security domain (D) of the system
would be:
D {(s^Cj), (54,02), (84,03), (s 4 ,c 4 ), (s 4 ,c 5 ),
( s 3' C l)' ( S 3' C2)' ( S 3' C 3)' ( S 3' C4)' ( S 3' C 5)'
(32/Cj), (s 2 ,c 2 ), (s 2 fC 3 ), (s 2 ,c4 ), (s 2 ,c 5 ),
{B1 ,C 1 ) t (Sj,C2 ), (S lfC3 ), (8 lfC4 ), (S lfC5 )}
Suppose that four users of the system, all members of a work
group (gA ), have the following security access profiles:
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Figure 2. Individual and Group Security Domains
in a Hypothetical System.
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A listing of the group security domain follows:
6a = {(s 3 rC 3 ), (s 3 ,c 4 ),
( S 2' C 3) ' ( S2' C4) i
(S^Cj), (s1 ,c4 )}
d. Label Syntax
Under this proposed extended system, subject and
object sensitivity labels (A) would have the following
syntax: AL = (s if CL ) . That is, every subject and object in
the system will be stamped with a single sensitivity level
and a compartment list specifying one or more authorized
compartments
.
(1) Subject Labels. Subjects in the system might
have authorized access to one, a few, or many compartments.
For example, the system's security kernel would grant an
intelligent agent designed to conduct a context matching
search access to any data base object stamped with a
sensitivity label equal to or lower than the agent's. (Note
that a subject who's compartment list is identical to the
compartment list of a work group's security domain could, in
a sense, "work for the group.")
(2) Object Labels. In an organization using FT-
CSCW, system objects should probably be limited to single
compartments. Multiple compartment labels which match group
security domain compartment labels in a sense give an object
a "group identity," but matching compartment lists do not
necessarily guarantee the group exclusive access to the
object. System users not members of the group may still have
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matching compartment lists, and under many conditions,
objects created within groups may need to be shared with all
authorized subjects. If exclusive group rights is a
requirement, a simple mechanism would be to create temporary
exclusive compartments for each group,
e. Group Security Profile
Let the highest sensitivity level and the compartment
list of each group be called the group's security profile.
In our hypothetical example above, gA 's security profile would
be: (s 3 , {c 3 , c 4 >) Note that a group security profile is in
the same format as a subject label, and in fact can act as a
subject label template. Group security profiles could be
incorporated in a system's operating system and the system
could use a look-up table of the organizational work group
list (G) and associated group security profiles to mediate
the user interface.
How might the users of a hypothetical FT-CSCW system
accomplish work? What might a user interface which
accommodates varying individual and group security domains
resemble, and how might it be used?
B. A HYPOTHETICAL USER INTERFACE
The following interface design is intended to illustrate
how an individual user might accomplish work on a system
organized around group work (and is not intended to be
predictive of the future of sophisticated CSCW. ) Note that
to individual users the operations of the reference monitor
underlying the TCB are largely transparent. As users "move"
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from display to display, the subjects and objects available
change if and when the group security domain changes. The
underlying system security policy stipulates access control,
FT-CSCW enforces the policy through the use of the group
sensitivity label system discussed above.
1. The Home Display
After log-on and authentication our hypothetical
user would be presented with a "home" display showing all
work groups of which the user is a member (Figure 3.)
File Edit Staff Special
Group C
Home Office
Figure 3. The Home Display.
The menu bar and block marked "Home Office" would
provide the user access to system utilities (including links,
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coordinators, intelligent agents, and other sophisticated
tools.) When accessed or invoked from the home display these
subjects would all be stamped with sensitivity labels
matching the user's personal security profile, (s ± , C L ) .
While "in" the home office, our user would have access to
objects and subjects which directly correspond to the user's
information security profile, to the mandatory and
discretionary access granted the user in accordance with the
organization's security policy.
Let us suppose our user chooses to work as a member of
group A. This would be accomplished by activating the Group
A block (via pointing device, keyboard command, voice
navigation, touch screen, or other means.) This would cause
a "Group A display" to replace the home display.
2. The Group A Display
The interface of the Group A display is essentially
similar to the home display; however, all subjects invoked
from the group A display would be stamped with sensitivity
labels identical to group A's security profile. Thus an
intelligent agent invoked from the group A display ( figure 4
)
would be able to conduct a key word search through all
compartments listed in group A's compartment list and no
others .
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File Edit Staff Special Group A
Messenger
Coordinator
Meeting in 5 minutes, Boss.




Key word search on
Logistics, CNSP N4
ShipLAN.
Report profile 7, Re






Figure 4. The Group A Display: An Agent is Instructed.
After instructing the intelligent agent, our hypothetical
user chooses to attend a previously scheduled virtually co-
located synchronous meeting by selecting the "meeting room"




File Edit Staff Special Group A
Please call home office.2SJ"
Group A: MEETING ROOM
Agenda Rules of Order Quorum
Fred: Hi everybody.
Joyce: Hi Fred, Hi Bob.
Ann's not here yet.
Ann's Agent: Ann will be two
minutes late. She
sends her regrets.
I have a message at
home. I'll be right back.
Figure 5. The Group A Display: In the Meeting Room.
The hypothetical conversation based dialogue in the
"meeting room" is occurring in a shared window, one into
which all group members are free to move authorized objects
from their personal (and private) group desktops. A true
shared window capable of supporting sophisticated CSCW would
probably be rich in role-playing and normative cues, and
might include voice, iconic symbols, full motion video or
other devices. The above example is greatly simplified.
Note that a messenger agent has requested that our
hypothetical user "please call home office." Any of several
external events could have triggered this message; however,
neither detailed nor differentiated messages can be passed
into the Group A environment from outside. Anything other
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than a simple generic message would constitute a potential
covert channel into group A (or from group A into another
group) and would be a violation of functional trust.
The development of a standard trusted interface would
greatly simplify the multi-level security problem for the
DoD. If such a standard were developed, COTS products which
met DoD security requirements would be much easier for
private software companies to develop, and DoD reliance on
massive (and expensive) custom software systems might be
greatly reduced. [Fact 92] The conceptual GUI described above
is presented in that spirit, but the author recognizes that
formidable technical difficulties must be overcome before
such a trusted interface could become a reality.
C. FUNCTIONALLY TRUSTED CSCH AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL
In addition to describing how work is accomplished at
the individual level, it is also necessary to describe how
FT-CSCW is accomplished at the organizational level, to
describe how the activities of the group would accomplish the
organization's routine tasks and strategic goals.
One possible mode of operation would be for FT-CSCW
groups to "start low and work up." Work groups would begin
work "constrained" by group security domains of low
sensitivity and limited compartment access. After a group
had accomplished all that was possible at a given level, low
clearance members would leave the group (their personal
memberships would be removed from the work group table,
)
causing the group security domain to "move up" in sensitivity
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level. The group would now have new higher level objects for
correlation and fusion into the group product. Eventually
the group would reach the highest sensitivity level in the
organization and no new objects would be available. At this
point the group's work would be "complete" and the group
product would be available for use or disposition by the
organization's strategic apex.
Such a pattern of operations would "distill" the
extensive object resource base of the organization into high
value, high sensitivity objects. Unless the formal object
declassification provision (and departure from the Bell-
LaPadula model) discussed above were available, the group
results could never be shared with low clearance members of
the organization, and non-apical work groups would have to
work without access to all the organization's information
resources and in ignorance of past results.
The next chapter will address how functionally trusted
CSCW might affect organizational structure and culture, and
will discuss some serious problems and limitations inherent
in the FT-CSCW concept.
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V, FT-CSCW: EFFECTS AND PROBLEMS
This chapter will discuss several first order
(efficiency) effects, second level (social) effects, and
underlying problems which in the author's opinion will
characterize, shape, and constrain organizations if they were
to attempt to implement FT-CSCW.
It must be emphasized that FT-CSCW is a broad conceptual
scheme, not a formal model. Some of the assertions or
observations may seem somewhat audacious and unsubstantiated,
but they are presented in the spirit of generalized
discourse, not the presentation and defense of a realistic
and/or precise model. (There will be further discussion of
the role and rationale behind the FT-CSCW scheme in the final
chapter.
)
A. FIRST LEVEL EFFECTS
1. Sparse Group Domains
One of the promises of sophisticated CSCW is its
capacity to marshal the resources of an organization simply
by creating an environment of enhanced communication and
collaboration. [Grud91] The author believes that if an
organization has partitioned its information domain into
multiple compartments, and for reasons of security is
unwilling or unable to connect the information in these
compartments, that organization will find that CSCW will not
deliver as advertised. That is, if a group security domain
is sparse (if it contains too few objects) the group will
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find that it cannot accomplish its assigned tasks using
sophisticated CSCW.
To the author, the irony is that organizations which
protect and nurture "high valuable" and "important"
information (such as Military Intelligence Activities) may
watch organizations which process "low value" and "open"
information enjoy orders of magnitude improvements in
efficiency and quality, and will be unable to follow suit.
If an organization is to experience the full benefits of
sophisticated CSCW, group security domains must be made as
large as possible. If a group's security domain is sparse,
if it contains too few objects, the group will find that it
cannot accomplish meaningful work.
2. The Breakdown of Compartmentation
In the author's opinion, the sparse domain effect
discussed above may cause organizations to minimize the
compartmentation of the information considered critical to
their missions. That is, based on experience or the
observation of successful FT-CSCW in other organizations,
information domains will be realigned to improve the
efficiency of CSCW groups.
Organizations which must handle information of the
highest sensitivity will probably operate in an approximation
of Dedicated Security Mode. Managers and analysts in such
organizations would have access to open information resources
imported from outside the organization, as well as non-open
information solicited or submitted from other organizations.
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Of course, under this Dedicated Mode arrangement, the single
large compartment which would comprise the organization's
security domain could still be guarded from unauthorized
access. How (and whether) such organizations would share the
results of their labor among "peer organizations" or simply
pass the results to higher authority is problematical. The
impact of one way information passage on the quality of the
work of low level group results is also problematical.
3. Stratification
In organizations operating in the virtual System
High mode discussed above, the residual high sensitivity
information which for reasons of legal or military necessity
cannot be shared with all members of the organization would
probably be modularized into several small compartments, each
containing only a few objects. These high sensitivity
objects would be known (from experience) to be of limited
value to most work groups. In the author's opinion, such
organizations would ultimately become stratified into high
sensitivity, full access groups and low sensitivity, limited
access groups. In such organizations, mandatory access
privileges would positively correlate with span of control.
The strategic apex would have access to all information,
"middle management" would have access to "most" information,
and "production" level personnel would have access to
"limited" but adequate information. (See figure 6.) Low-
level groups would be monitored by upper level groups.
Eventually low-level results would be passed to the upper-
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level cadre, who would fuse the information not available to
the lower level. Next the results would be passed to the
apex, who would fuse any relevant top-level information. The
size of a member's security domain does not necessarily
correlate with the amount of information with which the
individual would contend. While the strategic apex of the
would have full access to all objects in the system,
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Figure 6. Security Domains of the Different Structural
Levels of a Hypothetical Organization.
Although she approaches the issues with a group dynamic
perspective rather than one of computer security, Constance
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Perin has also reached the conclusion that CSCW may sustain
stratification in organizations. She states that even though
Groupware is widely recognized as fostering an egalitarian
and cooperative environment, there are social hierarchies
within its use, and the traditional system of subordinates
and superiors is reinforced rather than eliminated. [Peri91]
B. SECOND LEVEL EFFECTS
The stratification of organizations into limited access
and full access cadres would probably lead to several second
level (social) effects. In the author's opinion access
stratification will probably reinforce social stratification.
Access and status will become entrained. Apical cadres with
full access will enjoy high status, while production-level
cadres with limited access will enjoy lower status.
Organizations subject to this stratification would probably
tend towards mechanistic patterns of management and
operating, even though organistic patterns might better suit
the mission or challenges facing the group [Bola88].
Rothschild and Whitt state that knowledge diffusion is
crucial if democratic organizations are to avoid
monopolization of knowledge and "oligarchization. " [Roth86]
Kling states that conventional analyses of the effects of
computer-based technologies on complex organizations which
emphasize formal boundaries based on utilization of the
resource (like the FT-CSCW model discussed above) fail to
capture important social relationships which directly affect
the development of the system. Kling advocates the use of
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"web models" (resource-dependency models) which explain how
social leverage, the forces which promote smooth operation,
and social settings influence system development [Klin87].
In the author's opinion, security based stratification
reduces the value of the insights that might be gained from
analysis using methods like Fling's, as any insights or
alternative organizational structures suggested would
probably run afoul of the organization's existing security
policy.
Boland discusses several "information fantasies" which
are common in IS research. Information is not structured
data, the organization itself, power, intelligence, nor is it
perfectible. The value of information lies in its meaning,
in the result of engagement with the data. In this light,
objects which are "protected" in exclusive compartments are,
in fact, devalued [Bola87]. In an organization stratified by
security requirements, this devaluation is minimal from the
point of view of the strategic apex, but it is real,
nevertheless. From Boland 's perspective, any constraints on
interconnectivity are devaluing.
Once again, the author perceives an emerging picture
tinged with irony. CSCW promises a revolution in the work
place, perhaps even the emergence of new structures and work




Numerous problem areas plague the FT-CSCW concept.
1. The Human Trust Problem Revisited
The most serious problem with the FT-CSCW concept is
the Human Trust problem. Functional trust is not Trust. If
an organization chooses to relax its information security
standards in order to maximize interconnectivity, facilitate
CSCW, or for any other reason, it must be understood that
there is a price to be paid. If the value of a given object
is perceived to reside in the maintenance of absolute
secrecy, and if humans are part of the system (which is
manifest) then functional trust is not enough. The richer
the social interaction allowed by the system, the more
sophisticated the conferencing, messaging, and meeting
facilities, the greater the threat of covert channeling.
From the point of view of absolute secrecy, the great power
of CSCW is more than balanced by the great danger. In the
author's opinion, uneguivocally highly sensitive information
(such as weapons launch codes or records of ongoing
diplomatic negotiations) may never be allowed to be processed
in other than formally Trusted Systems running in Dedicated
Security Mode, and will only move from system to system via
the cryptographic equivalent of diplomatic pouch.
Even if Trust is abandoned in favor of Functional Trust,
other problems exist with the FT-CSCW concept.
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2 . Unstable Group Membership
A group's security domain is bounded by the least
common level of sensitivity and the least common compartment
access list of its members. Now suppose a group's membership
is not stable. That is, suppose the turnover rate of a
group's members is significant relative to the time-frame of
overall group task accomplishment. Leaving members or new
members might happen to have individual security domains
which are critical constraints to the group domain.
Therefore, without careful management, changes in group
membership could cause the group domain to expand or
contract. A group's members could report for work one day,
find that a new member has joined the group and find that
they no longer have access to all or part of the previous
day's group work. The unstable membership problem would be
ameliorated by the compartment breakdown effect discussed
above. If an organization's compartmentation is minimal,
changing memberships have minimal effect on group security
domains. It is noteworthy that this is one more possible
manifestation of the coincidence of access with status.
Under FT-CSCW, apical cadre groups could not add low cadre
individuals to their groups even if they wanted to, as the
low cadre recruit would cause the apical security domain to
collapse to low cadre levels. The only way low cadre
individuals could join an apical work group would be through
formal promotion.
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3. Quality Improvement Circles
Related to the discussion immediately above is the
problem of Quality Improvement Circles. In modern
organizations, Quality Improvement Circles direct the
resources of the organization towards process improvement by
empowering traditionally low status members of the
organization [Harr87]. in a stratified FT-CSCW organization,
Quality Improvement Circles would find themselves restricted
to the low access cadre group security domain. Now it may be
the case that this is all the access the circle requires to
accomplish its work, but how could the group know this? The
low access limitation is not only contrary to the
collaborative spirit of sophisticated CSCW [Grud91], it is
also contrary to the spirit of Total Quality Improvement
[Harr87].
4. Inter-Group CSCW
FT-CSCW between groups belonging to different
organizations remains a problem. Within organizations,
sensitivity labels would facilitate the operation of all
forms of sophisticated CSCW: messaging, conferencing, co-
authoring, augmentation, and even meeting room systems;
however, as discussed previously, extensive coordination
would be necessary to reconcile the sensitivity labels of one
TCB with the sensitivity labels of another (assuming of
course that both organizations were willing or legally
allowed to share sufficient security policy information to
make such coordination possible.)
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In the author's opinion, inter-organizational CSCW may
only be practical by the use of third-party meeting rooms,
meeting rooms which are common facilities run my third-party
TCB's. Such meeting rooms could be used by groups at
different sensitivity levels. That is, Unclassified, Secret,
or Top Secret meetings between the same organizations would
be allowed; however, each organization would probably place
restrictions on the objects their members would be allowed to
bring to the meetings. "Cleared for meeting" compartments,
compartments designed to contain objects the organization is
willing to "risk" at external meetings, would probably be
used. These third-party meeting rooms could be
geographically co-located, locally remote, or fully remote,
but from the point of view of TCB domains, they would be
fully isolated. Figure 7 illustrates the relationships.
5. Visitors
How to handle outsiders is also a problem for
organizations using FT-CSCW. Visitors to organizations would
have to be granted fully integrated clearance before they
could participate in CSCW or interact with work groups. One
solution which occurs to the author would be to create
visitor clearance profiles as a part of every work group.
Outsiders invited to join groups would be classified
according to the amount of access within the group security
domain required for them to contribute, and granted the
appropriate clearance package. Examples of visitor access
packages might be "full—access" for visitors expected to act
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temporarily as full members of the group and organization,
and "limited—access" for vendors and consultants whose goals
might not precisely coincide with the group and organization.
Limited access visitors would probably be very temporary
members of the group, as their highly restricted access would
constrain the entire group as long as they were members.
It must be stressed that all of the effects and problems
discussed above, like the FT-CSCW scheme itself, are
presented in a broad, non-technical vein. It is the author's
contention that the use of FT-CSCW will predispose an
organization to stratification and the abandonment of
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Figure 7. Two Organizations Using Third-Party Meeting Rooms
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The last chapter of this thesis will summarize my
findings and make some final observations.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis the author has attempted to describe in
broad terms the future of Groupware and CSCW, to summarize
the computer security requirements with which DoD and all
other government organizations must comply, and to describe a
broad scheme by which CSCW which complies with many (but not
all) of these requirements might be accomplished (FT-CSCW),
and finally to discuss some of the effects and problems which
might accompany FT-CSCW.
In the author's opinion, broad conceptual schemes such
as FT-CSCW are valuable to any field of endeavor as they help
conceptualize the interactions of relevant variables, surface
assumptions, and suggest areas which are being
underemphasized or even neglected by current research. For
example, Lee, Mansfield, and Sheth have developed a
conceptual model which describes a control scheme for
cooperative agents [Lee93]. The model involves the use of a
system of Interactive Transactions (ITXs) which continually
monitor and mediate individual user links to cooperative
events such as multimedia conferences. Each user's ITX set
attempts to optimize the user's participation in the
cooperative event by determining the state of system
resources relative to a set of fixed-point criteria. That
is, each ITX monitors the system link and takes prescriptive
action in accordance with preestablished criteria when the
cooperative state deviates from the fixed-point.
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The ITX scheme is similar to the FT-CSCW scheme in that
both are broad, conceptual models intended to explore
generalized relationships. It is also noteworthy that both
are also concerned with computer security. FT-CSCW is
concerned with the secrecy aspect, and ITX is concerned with
the system availability aspect. In the author's opinion,
this dichotomy of security interests is representative of
CSCW related research. As was discussed earlier, research is
occurring on a broad front from the highly technical to the
broadly sociological, and many disparate, loosely related
issues are involved. There is nothing "wrong" with this
situation. All of the issues addressed in the literature are
important, germane, and should be addressed. System
reliability is a significant issue and the ITX scheme serves
a valuable service by exploring the relationship of this
issue to cooperative agents. In the same vein, the FT-CSCW
scheme attempts to explore the relationship of information
secrecy to CSCW.
Concerning the three aspects of computer security, data
integrity, system reliability, and secrecy are clearly of
interest to all users; but not all users broach all three
aspects with equal emphasis. It is only natural that
applications tailored to database management should emphasize
data integrity and that applications tailored to
communications should emphasize system reliability, but
secrecy is not so much a matter of the design of any
particular application as it is the use to which the
application is put. Secrecy is the realm of information
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management, not the realm of the physical management of Is
and Os. It is the author's hope that this discussion of the
security aspects Of CSCW will acquaint some readers with
security constraints as they impact DoD and some readers with
CSCW and Groupware.
A. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Several possible avenues for possible research in the
security aspects of CSCW occur to the author.
1. A Formal FT-CSCW Model
The author has presented a broad informal scheme
for FT-CSCW. As a follow-on project, a formal mathematical
model of FT-CSCW should be developed which could be used to
explore the logical ramifications of the extensions to the
Bell-LaPadula proposed by the author. Such a model would be
of greatest interest to that segment of researchers most
concerned with Computer Security issues, but in the author's
opinion is the necessary next step if the secrecy related
security issues raised by this thesis are to be addressed by
the CSCW/Groupware community.
2. A FT-CSCW Pilot Project
The Naval Postgraduate School should invest in the
software and hardware to implement a broad based CSCW pilot
program which would allow faculty and students to explore the
full functionality of CSCW. Meeting rooms, message systems,
co-authoring/argumentation systems, and conference systems
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should be installed, and as far as is possible with current
technology and COTS Groupware, integrated into a single
system with a common interface. This NPS-CSCW System would
be a valuable platform for addressing all aspects of
CSCW/Groupware, from the highly technical issues which would
probably be of greatest interest to the NPS Computer Science
Faculty and Students, to the sociology /management issues
which would probably be of greatest interest to the NPS
Administrative Science Faculty and Students. Further, all
security aspects could be examined: Secrecy, Integrity, and
System Availability. Class projects and administrative work
utilizing this NPS-CSCW system would serve instructional and
operational purposes, while simultaneously providing an
extensive and ongoing research environment for faculty and
thesis students. For a reasonable investment, NPS could
become the DoD leader in applied and theoretical CSCW.
3. FT-CSCW and C 4 I 2
A further avenue of research would be to relate the
issues discussed in this thesis directly to Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, and Information
Systems (C 4 I 2 ) currently utilized by the DoD. This could
serve as a means for relating highly specific DoD
requirements and systems to the promise of sophisticated
CSCW. Information Warfare (IW), Command and Control Warfare
(CCW), and other C 4 I 2 subdisciplines unfamiliar and somewhat
esoteric to the civilian community could be related to the
more "mundane" topics currently under discussion in the
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CSCW/Groupware literature. Such C 4 I 2 /CSCW research might
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